| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An issue in Systrome Validation & Certification 1.0 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service via the t URL parameter in the qrcode_auth.html component |
| In Modem, there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01775984; Issue ID: MSV-8907. |
| If BIND encounters a particular invalid data structure in a DNS record, it will accept the invalid data, and may subsequently abort and exit.
BIND will first need to store a DNS record for a key (KEY, DNSKEY, etc.). That key must specify a PRIVATEDNS algorithm (253), and in the algorithm identifier, improperly give a length longer than the actual identifier data. The invalid identifier will be stored. If BIND later needs to render that record to text, it will use the invalid length during processing, leading to a consistency check failing.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1. |
| It is possible for an attacker's zone to respond to a query with an RRSIG that has a smaller number of labels than the zone in which the RRSIG is contained. This causes `named` to produce a wildcard name for a zone that is shorter than the attacker's zone, which can result in cache poisoning. For this attack to have any effect, the resolver under attack must have set `synth-from-dnssec yes;` (which is the default).
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. An attacker who uses a vulnerability present in versions prior to 6.10.2 can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires loading a PDF with a large trailer `/Size` value in incremental mode. This has been fixed in pypdf 6.10.2. As a workaround, one may apply the changes from the patch manually. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. An attacker who uses a vulnerability present in versions prior to 6.10.1 can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires cross-reference streams with wrong large `/Size` values or object streams with wrong large `/N` values. This has been fixed in pypdf 6.10.1. As a workaround, one may apply the changes from the patch manually. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.21.3, pypdf can consume excessive time and memory when an application accesses the page count of a crafted encrypted PDF whose page tree declares a forged /Count value. Even after successful decryption, page-count retrieval trusts the unvalidated declared count instead of walking the page tree, allowing the attacker-controlled value to drive excessive work and memory use. This issue is fixed in version 6.21.3. |
| A flaw was found in luksmeta. A local attacker with administrative privileges can cause data corruption when saving metadata to a Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) device. Due to incorrect boundary calculations and flawed overlap detection, new metadata entries can be written beyond available free space or over existing records. This issue can corrupt stored encrypted payload data or existing metadata, potentially rendering the affected data inaccessible. |
| Seroval facilitates JavaScript value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. Prior to 1.6.8, fromJSON and fromCrossJSON do not validate a sequence node's done index. A crafted done index can create an iterator that never finishes when application code consumes it to completion. An unauthenticated request to a service that deserializes untrusted input can therefore block the event loop, exhaust process memory, or make the service unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.8. |
| zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 0.6.0 until 9.0.0, the AES entry reader in src/aes.rs verifies its HMAC only when the attacker-controlled data counter reaches zero. If the underlying bounded reader reaches the real end of the archive while data_remaining is still positive, or if an encrypted entry has no payload, the reader can return a clean end of stream without reading and comparing the authentication tag. Applications using by_index_decrypt, by_name_decrypt, by_path_decrypt, or password-enabled by_index_with_options can therefore accept modified plaintext without an authentication error. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the Elixir standard library's JSON module allows an unauthenticated attacker who supplies a JSON document to cause a denial of service through CPU and memory exhaustion.
JSON.decode/1 and JSON.decode!/1 convert each integer literal with erlang:binary_to_integer/1 and do not bound its length. A literal of one million digits decodes successfully but costs 100 to 300 times as much CPU as a string of the same length, so one request body of a few megabytes holds a scheduler for about a second. A literal of more than about 1.29 million digits raises SystemLimitError. Applications generated by phx.new decode request bodies with JSON in Plug.Parsers, before routing and authentication.
This issue affects elixir: from 1.18.0-rc.0 before 1.18.6, from 1.19.0-rc.0 before 1.19.7, and from 1.20.0-rc.0 before 1.20.5. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the Elixir standard library's URI module allows an attacker who supplies a URL to cause a denial of service through CPU exhaustion.
URI.parse/1 converts the port component with String.to_integer/1 in split_authority/1 (lib/elixir/lib/uri.ex) without bounding its length, so a port of up to 1,262,592 decimal digits produces a bignum of that size and a longer one raises SystemLimitError. Rendering the parsed URI back to text (URI.to_string/1, inspect/1, logging, error formatting) converts the bignum with :erlang.integer_to_binary/1, which is quadratic on Erlang/OTP 27, 28 and 29.0: a 400,000-digit port renders in about 2.6 seconds and a 1 MB port in about 18 seconds. Ports above 65535 are also accepted.
This issue affects elixir: from 0.5.0 before 1.18.6, from 1.19.0-rc.0 before 1.19.7, and from 1.20.0-rc.0 before 1.20.5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: Place upper limit on station AID
Any station configured with an AID over 20 causes a firmware crash.
This situation occurred in our testing using an AP interface on 7922
hardware, with a modified hostapd, sourced from Mediatek's OpenWRT
feeds.
In stock hostapd, station AIDs begin counting at 1, and this
configuration is prevented with an upper limit on associated stations.
However, the modified hostapd began allocation at 65, which caused the
firmware to crash. This fix does not allow these AIDs to work, but will
prevent the firmware crash.
This crash was only seen on IFTYPE_AP interfaces, and the fix does not
appear to have an effect on IFTYPE_STATION behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate num_aces and harden ACE walk in smb_inherit_dacl()
smb_inherit_dacl() trusts the on-disk num_aces value from the parent
directory's DACL xattr and uses it to size a heap allocation:
aces_base = kmalloc(sizeof(struct smb_ace) * num_aces * 2, ...);
num_aces is a u16 read from le16_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->num_aces)
without checking that it is consistent with the declared pdacl_size.
An authenticated client whose parent directory's security.NTACL is
tampered (e.g. via offline xattr corruption or a concurrent path that
bypasses parse_dacl()) can present num_aces = 65535 with minimal
actual ACE data. This causes a ~8 MB allocation (not kzalloc, so
uninitialized) that the subsequent loop only partially populates, and
may also overflow the three-way size_t multiply on 32-bit kernels.
Additionally, the ACE walk loop uses the weaker
offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) minimum size check rather than
the minimum valid on-wire ACE size, and does not reject ACEs whose
declared size is below the minimum.
Reproduced on UML + KASAN + LOCKDEP against the real ksmbd code path.
A legitimate mount.cifs client creates a parent directory over SMB
(ksmbd writes a valid security.NTACL xattr), then the NTACL blob on
the backing filesystem is rewritten to set num_aces = 0xFFFF while
keeping the posix_acl_hash bytes intact so ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()'s
hash check still passes. A subsequent SMB2 CREATE of a child under
that parent drives smb2_open() into smb_inherit_dacl() (share has
"vfs objects = acl_xattr" set), which fails the page allocator:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5226 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x46c/0x9c0
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x46c/0x9c0
___kmalloc_large_node+0x68/0x130
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x24/0x70
__kmalloc_noprof+0x4c9/0x690
smb_inherit_dacl+0x394/0x2430
smb2_open+0x595d/0xabe0
handle_ksmbd_work+0x3d3/0x1140
With the patch applied the added guard rejects the tampered value
with -EINVAL before any large allocation runs, smb2_open() falls back
to smb2_create_sd_buffer(), and the child is created with a default
SD. No warning, no splat.
Fix by:
1. Validating num_aces against pdacl_size using the same formula
applied in parse_dacl().
2. Replacing the raw kmalloc(sizeof * num_aces * 2) with
kmalloc_array(num_aces * 2, sizeof(...)) for overflow-safe
allocation.
3. Tightening the per-ACE loop guard to require the minimum valid
ACE size (offsetof(smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) and
rejecting under-sized ACEs, matching the hardening in
smb_check_perm_dacl() and parse_dacl().
v1 -> v2:
- Replace the synthetic test-module splat in the changelog with a
real-path UML + KASAN reproduction driven through mount.cifs and
SMB2 CREATE; Namjae flagged the kcifs3_test_inherit_dacl_old name
in v1 since it does not exist in ksmbd.
- Drop the commit-hash citation from the code comment per Namjae's
review; keep the parse_dacl() pointer. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in rpd of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent OSPF peer to disclose rpd memory or cause a rpd crash via a malformed OSPF packets. |
| Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, node-forge did not validate the AES-GCM tagLength option passed to start() during decryption through forge.cipher.createDecipher(). When an application derived tagLength from received data or used an unset or zero-like configuration value, a value that converted to zero together with an empty or missing authentication tag caused the calculated and supplied tags to compare as empty, so decipher.finish() accepted unauthenticated ciphertext. Applications that omit tagLength to use the 128-bit default or pass a fixed valid tag length are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a specific IS-IS SRv6 packet when SRv6 and Flexible Algorithm are enabled. |
| When writing a long cookie name and value to a Netscape cookie jar, a remote
HTTP server can make `curl` write a record that exceeds its line-length
parsing limit. Consequently, any subsequent `curl` invocation reading from
that same cookie jar using `--cookie` silently aborts parsing prematurely upon
encountering the too long line, ignoring all subsequent valid cookies in the
file. |
| Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, node-forge accepted a PKCS#12 MAC or PKCS#12 password-based encryption iteration count of zero or less. pki.pbe.generatePkcs12Key() then returned a constant key independent of the password and salt, allowing crafted PKCS#12 input processed by forge.pkcs12.pkcs12FromAsn1() to bypass password-based integrity checks. Predictable encryption keys and IVs also affected PKCS#12 PBE using pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC or pbewithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC, including shrouded key bags, encrypted SafeContents, and PKCS#8 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY input processed independently by forge.pki.decryptPrivateKeyInfo(). PBES2/PBKDF2-encrypted content is unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1. |
| When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size.
Impact:
An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and __transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending record is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the broker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is not sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively unlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications produce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and cleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to trusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record's declared decompressed body size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation, log-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with InvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected, as its default is effectively unlimited. |
