| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Mollie webhook endpoint accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters and never verifies that they belong together:
* commerceTransactionHash — selects which Craft Commerce transaction is completed
* id — selects which Mollie payment is queried for its status
An unauthenticated attacker holding any paid Mollie payment ID from the merchant’s account can pair it with any transaction hash.
Commerce queries Mollie, sees status: paid, and marks the target transaction successful for that transaction’s full
amount, regardless of how much was actually paid. |
| Postiz signs its session, invitation and password reset tokens with one shared secret and without any marker of what a token is for. A route that refreshes the credentials of a browser-extension channel signed data taken from the request itself and stored the result where the requesting user can read it back. A user could therefore obtain a validly signed token containing any claims they choose, which the application accepts as a session, as an organization invitation with a chosen role, as a password reset or as an enterprise provisioning token.
A second, narrower route that creates team invitations signs extra fields from the request body in the same way. |
| python-jose through 3.5.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to forge JWTs because HMACKey and CryptographyHMACKey accept zero-length HMAC secrets. When an application's HS256/HS384/HS512 verification key resolves to empty, such as an oct JWK with empty k, attackers can forge tokens with arbitrary claims that jwt.decode accepts. |
| gose parsed the JWS `crit` header into `JwsHeader.Crit` and then never read it. RFC 7515 §4.1.11 requires a recipient to reject a JWS whose listed critical extension parameters it does not understand. gose implements no header extensions, so every token carrying a non-empty `crit` should have been rejected — and none were. |
| The DHCPv4 client in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c maintained its transaction identifier (iface->config.dhcpv4.xid) as a counter rather than as a per-transaction random value. It was seeded once with sys_rand32_get() in dhcpv4_start_internal(), incremented by one in dhcpv4_send_discover() and dhcpv4_send_decline(), and never changed by dhcpv4_send_request() — so every RENEWING and REBINDING exchange reused, unchanged, the identifier that had already appeared on the wire in the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER at boot, and where the identifier did move it moved predictably by one. RFC 2131 4.1 requires a single identifier per transaction, chosen so that clients are unlikely to collide.
This identifier is the client's only unpredictable reply-validation token. net_dhcpv4_input() accepts a BOOTP reply on op, a matching xid, and a matching chaddr (the interface MAC, which is public); the UDP callback is registered with a wildcard remote address and port, and no server-identifier or source-address check is applied. An attacker who learns one identifier — for example any host on the same segment that sees the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER, or a DHCP server or relay on a network the device previously joined — therefore retains a valid token for the device's whole uptime, and can predict the identifiers of later exchanges, without having to observe the unicast renew traffic or race the legitimate server.
A forged reply that passes those checks has effect regardless of client state, because dhcpv4_parse_options() applies its side effects before the state machine gate in dhcpv4_handle_reply(): the router option calls net_if_ipv4_set_gw() and the DNS option calls dns_resolve_reconfigure(). A single accepted datagram can thus repoint the device's default gateway and resolvers at attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting its traffic; during RENEWING or REBINDING a forged DHCPACK re-binds the lease with attacker-chosen parameters and a forged DHCPNAK removes the address and restarts configuration.
The fix draws a fresh sys_rand32_get() value at each point where a transaction begins — entering SELECTING, RENEWING and REBINDING, and at the INIT/INIT-REBOOT entry taken when an interface with a lease goes down — while REQUESTING and DECLINE keep the identifier of the exchange they belong to, as RFC 2131 requires. As a side effect the client also no longer discards a slow server's offer after retransmitting a discover, and the initial-discover backoff now draws its own randomness instead of deriving it from the identifier. |
| The WireGuard VPN service in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c updated the peer endpoint from a message it could not authenticate. In handle_transport_data(), when the 32-bit receiver index of an incoming transport-data message matched no session, the code both scheduled a new handshake and copied the datagram's source address into peer->endpoint with memcpy(&peer->endpoint, peer_addr, sizeof(peer->endpoint)). Because the receiver index is unknown, there is no key with which such a message could be verified, so the address written into peer->endpoint is entirely attacker-supplied. Every other endpoint update in the implementation happens only after authentication — after the Noise handshake in handle_handshake_init(), or after AEAD decryption plus the anti-replay check in wg_process_data_message().
The WireGuard listener is registered with net_udp_register() using no remote address or port filter and defaults to UDP port 51820 (CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PORT), and wg_ctrl_recv() resolves the peer by interface rather than by any cryptographic identity. Any host able to send a UDP datagram to that port can therefore reach the defect off-path, with no need to observe legitimate traffic: a 16-byte datagram carrying the transport-data type, zeroed reserved bytes and an arbitrary receiver index is sufficient. The vulnerable branch runs whenever the peer has neither a valid handshake nor a current keypair — the state at boot and after a session expires.
A single spoofed datagram redirects peer->endpoint to an address of the attacker's choosing, and all subsequent handshake initiations, keepalives and encrypted data packets are sent there. The legitimate peer never receives the initiations and so never re-authenticates, and nothing resets the endpoint afterwards, leaving the tunnel persistently unusable on devices whose peer does not initiate handshakes itself. The attacker can also relay the redirected initiations to the real peer to place itself in the path of the tunnel, observing ciphertext and traffic metadata and selectively dropping packets. WireGuard's end-to-end cryptography still prevents decryption or forgery of tunnel content, so the impact is loss of availability plus limited confidentiality, not key compromise.
The fix removes the endpoint learning from this path entirely: the stale-session recovery is kept, but the handshake is sent only to an endpoint learnt from an authenticated message, falling back to the configured cfg_endpoint, and the message is dropped when neither is known. CONFIG_WIREGUARD is marked experimental and is not enabled by default. |
| Google::Auth versions from 0.11 through 0.12 for Perl accept an authorization code from any local process because the gcloud-auth login callback does not check the OAuth state.
The gcloud-auth login and application-default login commands send a state parameter with the authorization request, then take the code from the first request to reach their loopback listener without comparing the returned state.
A local attacker can submit an authorization code for their own Google account. The CLI exchanges it and stores the refresh token as the user's credentials, so the user's tools then act as the attacker's account. |
| The `GITEA_TOKEN` of a Gitea Actions job authenticates as the `gitea-actions` system user, and the `/api/v1/user` email and GPG key endpoints accepted that user, so a job could register an email address and a GPG key on it; without required email confirmation (the default) the address is stored as activated. Commit verification treats a key without a real owner as the instance signing key, so any user who can run a workflow job could make commits signed with their own key show as trusted and signed by the instance in every repository where they appear, including pull requests to repositories the user cannot write to. The impact is limited to the displayed signature status: enforcement such as required signed commits only checks that a signature is verified and is unaffected, and no access is gained. The `/api/v1/user` routes now reject system users. |
| A flaw was found in Picketlink's SP signature validation; a SAML response containing zero assertion elements matching the signature check can allow an attacker to forge a SAML response and auth as any principal with any roles on the protected application. |
| A flaw was found in Picketlink Federation SAML; the unsolcited response handler would accept forged assertions with no verification or validation, permitting an unauthed attacker to authenticate as any principal in any role. This could lead to information disclosure, access to restricted operations, or other flaws. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/vmci: validate packet source for connected sockets
vmci_transport_recv_stream_cb() looks up sockets first by the full source
and destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The
fallback can select a non-listening socket without checking whether the
packet came from its stored peer.
This was reproduced with two VMCI contexts. A RST from the context not
stored in a TCP_SYN_SENT socket reset that socket after it was selected by
the destination-only lookup.
VMCI can process notification packets in bottom-half context when the
socket is not owned by user context, or defer packets to a workqueue. Use
vsock_check_source() after taking the socket lock in the bottom-half path,
and recheck after lock_sock() in the workqueue path. Listening sockets
continue to accept packets from any source.
Reply with a RST addressed from the received packet before dropping a
source that fails validation. This preserves the existing reset behavior
for bound non-listening and concurrently closed sockets without directing
the reset to a connected socket's stored peer. |
| A vulnerability was identified in rathena FluxCP up to 98cd4b8fd83228c11b36fb3d097b8e0f7c105a8d. This issue affects the function verifyiprange of the file lib/Flux/PaymentNotifyRequest.php of the component PayPal IPN Handler. The manipulation of the argument X-Real-IP leads to origin validation error. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, the OpenAI-compatible server configures Starlette CORSMiddleware with allowed_origins set to a wildcard by default. A malicious web page can use a victim's browser to reach an unauthenticated vLLM server on localhost, an internal network, or a VPN, call endpoints including GET /v1/models and POST /v1/chat/completions, consume GPU resources, and read responses. Cookie-based cross-site request forgery does not apply because credentials are disabled by default, and deployments requiring bearer authentication are exposed only when the caller already has a usable token. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim's unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker's browser, submit the victim's code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0. |
| Transmission 4.0.0 before 4.1.3 contains a permissive CORS vulnerability in handle_request() in rpc-server.cc that exposes the X-Transmission-Session-Id anti-CSRF token to any web origin. Malicious web pages can read the token from the 409 handshake response and replay it to issue RPC calls, enabling script-torrent-done execution, download-dir changes, or torrent and data deletion. |
| Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data vulnerability in the Sign in with Apple strategy in pow-auth Assent allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate another user via the user parameter of the authorization callback.
Apple posts the user's name to the callback endpoint in a user form parameter that the browser submits and the client controls. Assent.Strategy.Apple.callback/2 in lib/assent/strategies/apple.ex decodes that parameter, and fetch_user/2 merges it over the claims of the verified ID token, so the unverified map wins. An attacker who completes a Sign in with Apple login with their own Apple ID and edits the user parameter can replace sub, email, and any other claim. Applications that look up, link, or authorize accounts by the returned subject or email then act on the attacker's values.
This issue affects assent: from 0.1.25 before 0.3.2. |
| Origin Validation Error Vulnerability in HiRDB.
This issue affects HiRDB Server Version 10: from 10-00 before 10-12-01; HiRDB Server Version 9: from 09-00 through 09-66-22; HiRDB Server with Additional Function Version 9: from 09-00 through 09-66/V; HiRDB Server Version 9(32): from 09-02 through 09-66-22; HiRDB Server with Additional Function Version 9(32): from 09-00 through 09-66-/V. |
| Ladybird is a truly independent web browser. Prior to the c0d68bddf3e3616e5173835f0f4c155ee9700d91 commit, CSSStyleSheet.cssRules, insertRule(), and deleteRule() in Libraries/LibWeb/CSS/CSSStyleSheet.cpp did not enforce the stylesheet origin-clean flag with the required SecurityError, even though cross-origin imported stylesheets were correctly marked non-origin-clean. A malicious page could read parsed rules from a stylesheet loaded without CORS and could insert or delete rules in the victim stylesheet, bypassing the Same-Origin Policy. Reading could expose selectors, generated content, feature markers, or other sensitive rule text, while mutation could alter page visibility or layout. The issue does not provide memory corruption, code execution, or persistence after the attacker page closes. This vulnerability is fixed by commit c0d68bddf3e3616e5173835f0f4c155ee9700d91. |
| A flaw was found in dnsmasq. When following a CNAME in a DNS response, the resolver can cache records for the CNAME target without checking that those records belong to the responding server's authorized zone. In split-DNS deployments that send some domains to a specific upstream, an attacker who controls that upstream can inject cache entries for unrelated names. Later clients may then receive attacker-chosen addresses for those names. |
| Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in Drupal Commerce Stripe allows Signature Spoof. This issue affects Commerce Stripe versions: from 0.0.0 to 1.4, from 2.0.0 to 2.2.3. |
