| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The RTIO submission-queue verifier rtio_vrfy_sqe() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0) accumulated the results of K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() into its valid_sqe flag with &=. That macro returns nonzero on failure (it is built on K_SYSCALL_VERIFY_MSG(), which yields !(expr)), so every buffer permission check contributed the opposite of its result. A submission whose tx.buf, rx.buf or txrx.tx_buf/txrx.rx_buf pointer was not accessible to the calling thread was accepted, while a legitimate, thread-owned buffer caused the calling thread to be killed with a kernel oops.
The verifier runs on behalf of the rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() system call (also reached through the inline rtio_sqe_copy_in() wrapper), so it is driven directly by untrusted user-mode input on any image built with CONFIG_USERSPACE. A user thread that has been granted an RTIO context and an rtio_iodev object — the intended usage of RTIO userspace support, established via rtio_access_grant() — can submit an SQE whose buffer pointer and length name arbitrary kernel memory; the object check on sqe->iodev is unaffected and still passes, and the crafted SQE is forwarded to the bus driver unchanged.
Downstream consumers dereference the pointer with supervisor privilege. The generic I2C and I3C RTIO fallback handlers (drivers/i2c/i2c_rtio_default.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_rtio_default.c) copy sqe.rx.buf/sqe.tx.buf into struct i2c_msg and call i2c_transfer(), and the vendor SPI/I2C RTIO drivers behave equivalently. An RTIO_OP_RX submission therefore has peripheral data written into kernel memory of the attacker's choosing (arbitrary kernel write), an RTIO_OP_TX submission clocks kernel memory out over the bus (kernel memory disclosure), and a pointer to unmapped memory faults the kernel. This is a full escape from the user-mode isolation boundary that CONFIG_USERSPACE exists to enforce.
The defect was masked for years because the in-tree user-mode RTIO tests only exercise RTIO_OP_NOP and mempool-backed reads, neither of which reaches the affected checks. The fix negates each K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() result and additionally validates the TXRX transmit buffer read-only, matching the SPI, I2C and I3C handlers. |
| CGI::Cookie versions from 4.67 before 5.00 for Perl allow denial of service via the client cookie expires value used as a regex in parse.
CGI's cookie method reads the Cookie request header through parse, which interpolates the header's expires value unescaped into the substitution pattern that removes it from the cookie string.
A client can make the request die with an invalid pattern, or tie up the process with one that backtracks catastrophically. |
| CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl return upload filenames with any client-supplied path, including ../ and Windows paths.
The name returned for an uploaded file is the filename parameter of the part's Content-Disposition header, unchanged.
An application that saves the upload under this name can be made to write outside the intended directory. |
| CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl return request-derived values untainted under taint mode.
The upload filename, uploadInfo values, some path_info and script_name values, Accept results, and the name lists from url_param and cookie are returned without the taint flag, as is a cookie named expires from 4.67 on.
These values come from regex captures or hash keys, which Perl does not taint, so they pass -T checks unvalidated. |
| CGI versions from 4.71 before 5.00 for Perl allow denial of service via a plain string dereferenced as a symbolic reference in uploadInfo.
uploadInfo dereferences its argument and calls its filename method without checking that it is an upload filehandle. A plain string naming a defined global variable, such as the parameter value from ?upload=0, is treated as a symbolic reference, and the method call on it dies. |
| CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl allow memory, CPU and disk exhaustion via missing or unenforced request size, parameter and upload limits.
$CGI::POST_MAX defaults to no limit, and when set is not enforced for chunked multipart bodies or for the boundary line of a multipart body without a boundary= parameter. Bodies saved as PUTDATA, POSTDATA or PATCHDATA uploads are read into memory in one go, and nothing limits the number of parameters or uploads. |
| CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl allow an infinite loop on a short request body when $DISABLE_UPLOADS is set.
When $CGI::PUTDATA_UPLOAD or an upload hook is set, read_postdata_putdata takes a request body that is not a form submission. With $CGI::DISABLE_UPLOADS set, it discards the body by reading until Content-Length bytes have arrived. Once a body shorter than its Content-Length runs out, every read returns 0, so the loop never ends.
A client can keep a server process spinning with one such request. |
| The user-mode verification handler for the i3c_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_i3c_transfer() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c, validated the caller-supplied struct i3c_device_desc in place instead of snapshotting it. It confirmed only that the descriptor was readable by the calling thread (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ()), read target->bus once to check it with K_SYSCALL_OBJ(), and then passed the caller's live pointer down. The implementation z_impl_i3c_transfer() re-reads target->bus from that user memory and dispatches through it as DEVICE_API_GET(i3c, target->bus)->i3c_xfers(...), so the bus that was validated is not necessarily the bus that is used. DEVICE_API_GET() performs no runtime type check outside CONFIG_DEVICE_API_ASSERT builds.
On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and an I3C controller driver, a user thread that has been granted an I3C device object can exploit this with a second thread in the same memory domain: one thread calls i3c_transfer() while the other rewrites the bus field of the descriptor. The window between the check and the use spans the num_msgs validation, the message-array access check, a stack VLA allocation and a memcpy() of up to 32 struct i3c_msg, so the race is repeatable and can simply be retried until it lands.
When the substitution succeeds, the kernel dereferences an attacker-chosen pointer as a struct device, loads a function pointer from the attacker-controlled api table and calls it in supervisor mode with attacker-influenced arguments. This yields kernel-mode code execution from an unprivileged user thread — a complete escape of the userspace memory-protection sandbox; lesser outcomes are an arbitrary two-level kernel read or a kernel fault. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or without an I3C driver, are unaffected.
The fix copies the descriptor into a kernel-stack local with k_usermode_from_copy(), validates the bus in that copy, and dispatches on the copy, so the validated value is provably the value used. |
| The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_i2s_configure() in drivers/i2s/i2s_handlers.c copies the caller's struct i2s_config in from user memory and then, when cfg->frame_clk_freq is 0 (the API's "unconfigure the stream" request), jumps straight to z_impl_i2s_configure() without performing the K_SYSCALL_OBJ(config.mem_slab, K_OBJ_MEM_SLAB) ownership/type check or the block_size sanity check. The mem_slab field is a struct k_mem_slab *, so on that path a completely unvalidated, user-chosen pointer reaches driver code that is entitled to trust it as a real kernel object.
Any thread running under CONFIG_USERSPACE that has access to an I2S device object can trigger this with a single i2s_configure() call. Most in-tree drivers special-case frame_clk_freq == 0 and never store the caller's structure, but drivers/i2s/i2s_litex.c does not: i2s_litex_configure() only logs a warning for a mismatched frame clock, then memcpy()s the caller's config into stream->cfg and marks the stream I2S_STATE_READY. A subsequent i2s_trigger() with I2S_TRIGGER_START enables the FIFO interrupt, and the interrupt handlers i2s_litex_isr_rx() / i2s_litex_isr_tx() then call k_mem_slab_alloc() and k_mem_slab_free() on the attacker-supplied pointer in supervisor context.
The result is an arbitrary-pointer read/write primitive executed by the kernel on behalf of an unprivileged thread — k_mem_slab_alloc() takes a spinlock at slab->lock and reads and writes slab->free_list and the link word inside the returned "block" — which defeats the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary entirely. The same missing validation is a hazard for out-of-tree I2S drivers that retain the configuration on the unconfigure path. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are unaffected, since the verifier is not used.
The fix zeroes config.mem_slab and config.block_size on the unconfigure path so the driver can never receive an unvalidated pointer, while still allowing a stream to be unconfigured by a caller that does not own a memory slab, as the API documents. |
| The nRF link-layer receive paths of the open-source Bluetooth LE Controller did not validate the on-air LENGTH field of a received PDU against the maximum receive length that was used to program the radio. isr_rx_pdu() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/nordic/lll/lll_conn.c enqueued any non-empty data PDU after only the sequence-number and (for encrypted links) MIC checks, and the corresponding isr_rx() handlers in lll_central_iso.c, lll_peripheral_iso.c, lll_sync_iso.c and lll_scan_aux.c did the same for ISO and extended-advertising PDUs. The nRF radio stores the received header verbatim and truncates only the payload at PCNF1.MAXLEN, so a frame declaring more octets than were configured leaves a node buffer whose len field describes more data than the buffer holds.
An attacker within radio range that can emit a hand-crafted link-layer PDU — for a connection, any peer that establishes an unencrypted LE connection to a connectable advertiser; for CONFIG_BT_CTLR_SYNC_ISO, any broadcaster the device is synchronised to — can set the length byte up to 255 while the controller has programmed a much smaller maximum (lll->dle.eff.max_rx_octets, which is 27 until a Data Length Update, or the negotiated cis_lll->rx.max_pdu). No pairing, authentication or user interaction is required. On encrypted links the CCM MIC check normally rejects such a frame first, so the exposure is on unencrypted traffic, which is why the added check is placed after decryption.
The unchecked length reaches hci_acl_encode() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/hci/hci.c, which performs net_buf_add(buf, pdu_data->len) followed by a memcpy() of that many bytes out of the node_rx pool element. Because CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE both default to 27, this is an out-of-bounds read of up to roughly 228 bytes past the received PDU and a corresponding out-of-bounds write past the HCI ACL buffer into neighbouring buffers of the same pool; the tailroom test in net_buf_simple_add() is only enforced when CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING (or CONFIG_ASSERT) is enabled. On the ISO paths the same unchecked length makes isoal_rx_append_to_sdu() read past the ISO node buffer and emit adjacent controller RAM to the host as ISO data. The practical result is remote memory corruption and controller crashes, plus disclosure of controller memory into the host data path.
The fix rejects any received PDU whose length exceeds the value that was used to configure the radio reception. Note that lll_sync.c (periodic advertising sync reception) was not changed and still enqueues received PDUs without an equivalent bound. |
| Improper input validation in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via a crafted Chrome extension. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Incorrect authorization in WebUI in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| UI misrepresentation in Interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Missing authorization in ShadowDOM in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Incorrect authorization in Network in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Missing authorization in SiteIsolation in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Improper input validation in PDF in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker to potentially bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| UI misrepresentation in Autofill in Google Chrome on on Mac prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| UI misrepresentation in FullScreen in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
