| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice
Savino says:
"We are writing to report that this recent patch
(141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
NETEM.
The patch only checks the cl->cl_nactive field to determine whether
it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
incremented by init_vf [3].
By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].
However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
very low rate,
it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."
To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.
[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: Fix unsafe attribute parsing in output_userspace()
This patch replaces the manual Netlink attribute iteration in
output_userspace() with nla_for_each_nested(), which ensures that only
well-formed attributes are processed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Scrub packet on bpf_redirect_peer
When bpf_redirect_peer is used to redirect packets to a device in
another network namespace, the skb isn't scrubbed. That can lead skb
information from one namespace to be "misused" in another namespace.
As one example, this is causing Cilium to drop traffic when using
bpf_redirect_peer to redirect packets that just went through IPsec
decryption to a container namespace. The following pwru trace shows (1)
the packet path from the host's XFRM layer to the container's XFRM
layer where it's dropped and (2) the number of active skb extensions at
each function.
NETNS MARK IFACE TUPLE FUNC
4026533547 d00 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 xfrm_rcv_cb
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026533547 d00 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 xfrm4_rcv_cb
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026533547 d00 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 gro_cells_receive
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
[...]
4026533547 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 skb_do_redirect
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 ip_rcv
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 ip_rcv_core
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
[...]
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 __xfrm_policy_check
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 __xfrm_decode_session
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 security_xfrm_decode_session
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_XFRM_POLICY)
.active_extensions = (__u8)2,
In this case, there are no XFRM policies in the container's network
namespace so the drop is unexpected. When we decrypt the IPsec packet,
the XFRM state used for decryption is set in the skb extensions. This
information is preserved across the netns switch. When we reach the
XFRM policy check in the container's netns, __xfrm_policy_check drops
the packet with LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS because a (container-side) XFRM
policy can't be found that matches the (host-side) XFRM state used for
decryption.
This patch fixes this by scrubbing the packet when using
bpf_redirect_peer, as is done on typical netns switches via veth
devices except skb->mark and skb->tstamp are not zeroed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Verify event formats that have "%*p.."
The trace event verifier checks the formats of trace events to make sure
that they do not point at memory that is not in the trace event itself or
in data that will never be freed. If an event references data that was
allocated when the event triggered and that same data is freed before the
event is read, then the kernel can crash by reading freed memory.
The verifier runs at boot up (or module load) and scans the print formats
of the events and checks their arguments to make sure that dereferenced
pointers are safe. If the format uses "%*p.." the verifier will ignore it,
and that could be dangerous. Cover this case as well.
Also add to the sample code a use case of "%*pbl". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel: KVM: Mask PEBS_ENABLE loaded for guest with vCPU's value.
When generating the MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE value that will be loaded on
VM-Entry to a KVM guest, mask the value with the vCPU's desired PEBS_ENABLE
value. Consulting only the host kernel's host vs. guest masks results in
running the guest with PEBS enabled even when the guest doesn't want to use
PEBS. Because KVM uses perf events to proxy the guest virtual PMU, simply
looking at exclude_host can't differentiate between events created by host
userspace, and events created by KVM on behalf of the guest.
Running the guest with PEBS unexpectedly enabled typically manifests as
crashes due to a near-infinite stream of #PFs. E.g. if the guest hasn't
written MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, the CPU will hit page faults on address '0' when
trying to record PEBS events.
The issue is most easily reproduced by running `perf kvm top` from before
commit 7b100989b4f6 ("perf evlist: Remove __evlist__add_default") (after
which, `perf kvm top` effectively stopped using PEBS). The userspace side
of perf creates a guest-only PEBS event, which intel_guest_get_msrs()
misconstrues a guest-*owned* PEBS event.
Arguably, this is a userspace bug, as enabling PEBS on guest-only events
simply cannot work, and userspace can kill VMs in many other ways (there
is no danger to the host). However, even if this is considered to be bad
userspace behavior, there's zero downside to perf/KVM restricting PEBS to
guest-owned events.
Note, commit 854250329c02 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Disable guest PEBS temporarily
in two rare situations") fixed the case where host userspace is profiling
KVM *and* userspace, but missed the case where userspace is profiling only
KVM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in kerberos authentication
Setting sess->user = NULL was introduced to fix the dangling pointer
created by ksmbd_free_user. However, it is possible another thread could
be operating on the session and make use of sess->user after it has been
passed to ksmbd_free_user but before sess->user is set to NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: ets: Fix double list add in class with netem as child qdisc
As described in Gerrard's report [1], there are use cases where a netem
child qdisc will make the parent qdisc's enqueue callback reentrant.
In the case of ets, there won't be a UAF, but the code will add the same
classifier to the list twice, which will cause memory corruption.
In addition to checking for qlen being zero, this patch checks whether
the class was already added to the active_list (cl_is_active) before
doing the addition to cater for the reentrant case.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAHcdcOm+03OD2j6R0=YHKqmy=VgJ8xEOKuP6c7mSgnp-TEJJbw@mail.gmail.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: qfq: Fix double list add in class with netem as child qdisc
As described in Gerrard's report [1], there are use cases where a netem
child qdisc will make the parent qdisc's enqueue callback reentrant.
In the case of qfq, there won't be a UAF, but the code will add the same
classifier to the list twice, which will cause memory corruption.
This patch checks whether the class was already added to the agg->active
list (cl_is_active) before doing the addition to cater for the reentrant
case.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAHcdcOm+03OD2j6R0=YHKqmy=VgJ8xEOKuP6c7mSgnp-TEJJbw@mail.gmail.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Reset IRTE to host control if *new* route isn't postable
Restore an IRTE back to host control (remapped or posted MSI mode) if the
*new* GSI route prevents posting the IRQ directly to a vCPU, regardless of
the GSI routing type. Updating the IRTE if and only if the new GSI is an
MSI results in KVM leaving an IRTE posting to a vCPU.
The dangling IRTE can result in interrupts being incorrectly delivered to
the guest, and in the worst case scenario can result in use-after-free,
e.g. if the VM is torn down, but the underlying host IRQ isn't freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
codel: remove sch->q.qlen check before qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
After making all ->qlen_notify() callbacks idempotent, now it is safe to
remove the check of qlen!=0 from both fq_codel_dequeue() and
codel_qdisc_dequeue(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix memory leak in tipc_link_xmit
In case the backlog transmit queue for system-importance messages is overloaded,
tipc_link_xmit() returns -ENOBUFS but the skb list is not purged. This leads to
memory leak and failure when a skb is allocated.
This commit fixes this issue by purging the skb list before tipc_link_xmit()
returns. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: detect and prevent references to a freed transport in sendmsg
sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by
doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination
address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in
all the message chunks to be sent.
There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal
of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an
address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have
been set up and before the message is sent. This can happen if the send
buffer is full, during the period when the sender thread temporarily
releases the socket lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
This causes the access to the transport data in
sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association outqueue is flushed,
to result in a use-after-free read.
This change avoids this scenario by having sctp_transport_free() signal
the freeing of the transport, tagging it as "dead". In order to do this,
the patch restores the "dead" bit in struct sctp_transport, which was
removed in
commit 47faa1e4c50e ("sctp: remove the dead field of sctp_transport").
Then, in the scenario where the sender thread has released the socket
lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(), the bit is checked again after
re-acquiring the socket lock to detect the deletion. This is done while
holding a reference to the transport to prevent it from being freed in
the process.
If the transport was deleted while the socket lock was relinquished,
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() will return -EAGAIN to let userspace retry the
send.
The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1]
and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: separate no-async decryption request handling from async
If we're not doing async, the handling is much simpler. There's no
reference counting, we just need to wait for the completion to wake us
up and return its result.
We should preferably also use a separate crypto_wait. I'm not seeing a
UAF as I did in the past, I think aec7961916f3 ("tls: fix race between
async notify and socket close") took care of it.
This will make the next fix easier. |
| An issue was discovered in JasPer 2.0.14. There is a heap-based buffer over-read of size 8 in the function jp2_decode in libjasper/jp2/jp2_dec.c. |
| An issue was discovered in JasPer 2.0.14. There is a NULL pointer dereference in the function jp2_decode in libjasper/jp2/jp2_dec.c, leading to a denial of service. |
| An issue was discovered in JasPer 1.900.8, 1.900.9, 1.900.10, 1.900.11, 1.900.12, 1.900.13, 1.900.14, 1.900.15, 1.900.16, 1.900.17, 1.900.18, 1.900.19, 1.900.20, 1.900.21, 1.900.22, 1.900.23, 1.900.24, 1.900.25, 1.900.26, 1.900.27, 1.900.28, 1.900.29, 1.900.30, 1.900.31, 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4, 2.0.5, 2.0.6, 2.0.7, 2.0.8, 2.0.9, 2.0.10, 2.0.11, 2.0.12, 2.0.13, 2.0.14, 2.0.15, 2.0.16. There is a heap-based buffer over-read of size 8 in the function jas_image_depalettize in libjasper/base/jas_image.c. |
| An issue was discovered in JasPer 1.900.8, 1.900.9, 1.900.10, 1.900.11, 1.900.12, 1.900.13, 1.900.14, 1.900.15, 1.900.16, 1.900.17, 1.900.18, 1.900.19, 1.900.20, 1.900.21, 1.900.22, 1.900.23, 1.900.24, 1.900.25, 1.900.26, 1.900.27, 1.900.28, 1.900.29, 1.900.30, 1.900.31, 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4, 2.0.5, 2.0.6, 2.0.7, 2.0.8, 2.0.9, 2.0.10, 2.0.11, 2.0.12, 2.0.13, 2.0.14, 2.0.15, 2.0.16. There is a heap-based buffer overflow of size 1 in the function jas_icctxtdesc_input in libjasper/base/jas_icc.c. |
| An issue was discovered in JasPer 2.0.14. There is an access violation in the function jas_image_readcmpt in libjasper/base/jas_image.c, leading to a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation
VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that exploits insufficient branch predictor
isolation between a guest and a userspace hypervisor (like QEMU). Existing
mitigations already protect kernel/KVM from a malicious guest. Userspace
can additionally be protected by flushing the branch predictors after a
VMexit.
Since it is the userspace that consumes the poisoned branch predictors,
conditionally issue an IBPB after a VMexit and before returning to
userspace. Workloads that frequently switch between hypervisor and
userspace will incur the most overhead from the new IBPB.
This new IBPB is not integrated with the existing IBPB sites. For
instance, a task can use the existing speculation control prctl() to
get an IBPB at context switch time. With this implementation, the
IBPB is doubled up: one at context switch and another before running
userspace.
The intent is to integrate and optimize these cases post-embargo.
[ dhansen: elaborate on suboptimal IBPB solution ] |
