| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket.
org.apache.wicket.authorization.IAuthorizationStrategy declares isResourceAuthorized(), and that method has a single enforcement point in the framework: org.apache.wicket.request.handler.resource.ResourceRequestHandler, the handler that serves a resource reached through a mounted or shared ResourceReference. Components that are handed an org.apache.wicket.request.resource.IResource instance instead call IResource#respond() themselves from their own request listener and never construct that handler. In wicket-core these are org.apache.wicket.markup.html.link.ResourceLink, org.apache.wicket.markup.html.image.Image and org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.ImageButton; in wicket-extensions it is org.apache.wicket.extensions.ajax.AjaxDownloadBehavior. A resource restricted by a custom isResourceAuthorized() implementation, or by an @AuthorizeResource annotation from wicket-auth-roles, is therefore enforced when it is requested through its own resource URL and is not enforced when the same instance is served through the component that holds it.
Which of the two happens is decided by the constructor the application used, and not by anything the application can see in the rendered page. ResourceLink(String, ResourceReference) renders a resource URL and the request is authorized; ResourceLink(String, IResource) renders a component listener URL and it is not. Image, ImageButton and AjaxDownloadBehavior each offer the same pair of constructors and behave the same way. Image and ImageButton write that listener URL into the src attribute of the tag they render, so a browser requests it without any action by the user, and the resource an Image serves may also come from the component's model.
An application is affected where it restricts a resource through IAuthorizationStrategy#isResourceAuthorized() or an @AuthorizeResource annotation and then hands that same resource to one of those components as an IResource. An application that does not restrict resources at all is not affected, and neither is a resource that is only mounted or registered as a shared resource. The pattern does not have to be written by the application itself: org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.repeater.data.table.export.ExportToolbar builds each of its export links from an IResource instance, so the exported contents of a data table are served without the resource check in any application that adds that toolbar.
As a workaround, register the resource in the application's shared resources and pass the resulting ResourceReference to the component instead of the IResource, so that the request is routed through the handler that consults the authorization strategy.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. |
| Gitea Actions task tokens authenticate to the REST API as a shared system user with a negative ID, which repository, organization, project and key filters treated as having no owner restriction, and the token carried no API scope to restrict user-scoped routes. A user who can run a workflow could use the job's token with `GET /api/v1/user/repos` to list every repository on the instance, including private repositories of other users and organizations, with their metadata. Repository contents remained protected by per-repository permission checks. System users now own nothing, and `/api/v1/user` routes other than `GET /api/v1/user` accept only individual and bot accounts. |
| The `/{username}` web route accepted personal access tokens over HTTP Basic authentication without checking their scope. A token confined to an unrelated scope, such as `read:issue`, could read its owner's private activity through the user RSS/Atom feed and the profile activity tab, and other members' activity in a private organization through the organization feed; a public-only token could list the owner's private repositories and organizations and render private profile READMEs. For a site administrator's token this applied to every account. Tokens are now accepted on this route only for feeds, which require `read:user` or `read:organization`. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in WP Swings Return Refund and Exchange For WooCommerce woo-refund-and-exchange-lite allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Return Refund and Exchange For WooCommerce: from n/a through 4.6.4. |
| A flaw was found in FreeIPA. The trust-fetch-domains command is gated by a read-only permission on the trust object rather than a trust-administration permission, allowing an authenticated, non-privileged IPA user to trigger a privileged Active Directory trust refresh using an attacker-supplied server and credentials, resulting in unauthorized, attacker-controlled modification of trusted-domain and ID-range identity data in the IPA LDAP directory. |
| The Media Library Assistant WordPress plugin before 3.44 does not check that the requesting user is allowed to view a post before disclosing which taxonomy terms are assigned to it, allowing any authenticated user, such as a subscriber, to learn the term assignments of private attachments and posts. |
| The Premium Packages WordPress plugin before 7.2.2 does not prevent unauthenticated visitors from overwriting the stored price of items in their shopping cart, allowing them to create orders for any product at an arbitrary total of their choosing. |
| The Payable Payment Gateway for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 1.3.1 does not verify the authenticity of an incoming payment notification before marking a WooCommerce order paid or failed, allowing unauthenticated attackers to change the payment status of any order in the store regardless of the payment method it was placed with. |
| The Kali Forms — Contact Form & Drag-and-Drop Builder WordPress plugin before 2.4.30 does not perform a capability check on its test-email handler, relying only on a nonce that is available to any logged-in user, so a low-privileged user such as a Subscriber can make the site send email to an arbitrary recipient with a spoofed sender address. |
| The Mapster WP Maps WordPress plugin before 2.0.6 does not perform any authorization check on a REST API route that writes post data, allowing unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the title of arbitrary posts, create arbitrary published posts, and overwrite the Mapster WP Maps WordPress plugin before 2.0.6's stored settings. |
| Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request. A user with read access to a repository could place a commit of their own in it, through a fork pull request or an AGit push, and submit a review naming that commit on a pull request whose head branch is in the same repository. On instances with a runner serving the repository, the attacker's workflow then ran without approval, received the Actions secrets of the repository and its owner, and got a `GITEA_TOKEN` with write access to the repository. Review-triggered workflows now run on the pull request head. |
| Gitea did not reject personal access tokens restricted to public resources (`public-only`) on the organization Actions runner registration-token endpoint, and the runner registered with the resulting token was not limited to public repositories. Holding only such a token with `write:organization` that belongs to an owner of a public organization, an attacker could register an organization-level runner and receive jobs of the organization's private repositories that have Actions enabled, including the workflow content, Actions secrets and variables, and a task token with access to the private repository. The issue widens what the restricted token can reach; it gives nothing beyond what the owner's full account can already do. |
| The API routes for releases, release assets, milestones and repository labels did not reject changes to archived repositories. A user with write access to an archived repository, or a holder of such a user's write-scoped token, could replace or delete release assets while keeping their download URLs, delete releases and tags, and create, edit or delete milestones and labels of a repository that is meant to be read-only. Changing requests on these routes now return 423 Locked for archived repositories. |
| The issue timeline API and the web issue page hid cross-reference events that point at issues the reader cannot access, but not "dependency added" and "dependency removed" events. When a readable issue had been linked as a dependency to an issue in a repository the reader cannot access, for example a private repository, any reader of the first issue, including anonymous users of a public repository, received the linked issue's current title, body, state, labels, poster and attachment names through the API, and its repository, number and title on the web page. Creating the link requires access to both issues; comments and attachment downloads of the linked issue stayed protected. Dependency events are now filtered with the same read permission check; a related exposure of unlinked attachment metadata through hidden dependency placeholders was already fixed in 28.2.0. |
| The OCI registry's cross-repository blob mount checked the target package against the token's `public-only` restriction, but checked the source blob only against the full account permissions of the token owner. A `public-only` token with `write:package` scope, whose owner can read a private package and write to a public package namespace, could mount a blob of the private package into the public package. The private blob, such as a container layer, could then be downloaded by anyone through the public package. |
| The OAuth2 userinfo endpoint (`/login/oauth/userinfo`) decided whether to limit the `groups` claim to public organizations by re-parsing the `Authorization` header as an OAuth2 access token instead of using the scope of the credential that authenticated the request. When a public-only OAuth2 token was sent as a query parameter or form field, or a public-only personal access token was used, that scope came back empty and the claim listed the token owner's private organizations, teams and concealed memberships. The disclosure is limited to the owner's organization and team names and memberships; no repository content is exposed. The endpoint now uses the scope of the authenticating token. |
| `DELETE /api/v1/orgs/{org}/repos` deletes all repositories of an organization, but it did not enforce the public-only restriction of access tokens: the route only checked that the organization itself was public. A public-only token of an owner of a public organization could therefore permanently delete the organization's private repositories, which such a token must not reach. Routes that require organization ownership now reject public-only tokens. |
| Repository and organization project boards listed the pull requests that reference each issue on the board without checking whether the viewer can read them. When a private pull request mentions an issue on a board the viewer can open, the board revealed the private repository's path and the pull request's number, title and state, to anonymous visitors in the case of a public board. The pull request body, diff and files were not exposed. Boards now skip linked pull requests in repositories where the viewer cannot read pull requests. |
| The WP Booking System - Booking Calendar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the wpbs_action_ajax_calendar_remove_note() function in versions up to, and including, 2.1.0.5 This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary calendar notes belonging to any calendar. |
| The Redux Framework plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.15. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to view the entire Redux options payload — including plaintext password field values, API keys, license keys, and SMTP credentials — exposed in the inline redux_<opt_name> JavaScript block on wp-admin/profile.php. The Users extension is loaded automatically for every Redux instance registered by any installed theme or plugin, meaning any site running Redux Framework is affected regardless of whether the developer explicitly configured the Users extension. |
