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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-86920 | 1 Apple | 5 Ios And Ipados, Ipados, Iphone Os and 2 more | 2026-11-02 | 5.5 Medium |
| An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.2 and iPadOS 26.7.2, iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2, visionOS 27. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115975 | 1 Cervantessec | 1 Cervantes | 2026-11-02 | 7.1 High |
| Broken access control in JiraController in Cervantes version v1.3-beta could allow an attacker to create, edit, or delete Jira tickets for vulnerabilities in other projects | ||||
| CVE-2026-93336 | 1 Canonical | 1 Juju | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in the unit resources download route in Canonical Juju 4.0 through 4.0.15 allows a controller-authenticated principal (a unit agent, or a user with only login permission) to read any application's charm resource in any model, including container-registry credentials, via a crafted request naming an arbitrary unit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-120463 | 1 Sassanix | 1 Warracker | 2026-11-02 | 6.5 Medium |
| Warracker before 1.0.4 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in its Paperless-ngx integration that allows an authenticated, non-administrative user to bypass document ownership restrictions by searching for and linking another user's private document ID to a warranty they own using the `other` document type. Attackers can exploit insufficient authorization checks in the `paperless_search_and_link()` and `serve_paperless_document()` route handlers in file_routes.py to retrieve and disclose private documents belonging to another user via the shared Paperless-ngx API credential, resulting in unauthorized read access and confidentiality loss. | ||||
| CVE-2026-86925 | 1 Apple | 5 Ios And Ipados, Ipados, Iphone Os and 2 more | 2026-11-02 | 5.5 Medium |
| An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, visionOS 27.2. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82115 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.WebSocketMessageBroadcastHandler, the request handler Wicket's native WebSocket support uses to deliver an incoming frame, resolves the shared resource named by the client's handshake parameter and calls WebSocketResource#onPayload() on it directly, without consulting IAuthorizationStrategy#isResourceAuthorized(). That method has a single enforcement point in the framework, org.apache.wicket.request.handler.resource.ResourceRequestHandler, which the WebSocket transport does not pass through, and WebSocketResource#respond() is final and empty. No route to a WebSocketResource therefore asks the configured authorization strategy whether the caller may use it, and an @AuthorizeResource annotation on such a class has no effect. A caller needs a bound Wicket session and the name of the resource. The name is not a secret: Wicket writes it into the page that opens the connection. No page of the application is otherwise involved, because a request naming a resource is served with a throwaway page. All of the resource's callbacks are reached this way, including onConnect() and both onMessage() overloads, and what a callback pushes back through WebSocketRequestHandler goes to the caller's own connection. An application is affected where it registers a WebSocketResource as a shared resource and relies on the authorization strategy to restrict it. What the caller gains is whatever that resource's callbacks do with a text or binary message of the caller's choosing. The connection is registered under the caller's own session, so it gives no access to another user's connection. As a workaround, reject unauthorized connections with an IWebSocketConnectionFilter registered through WebSocketSettings#setConnectionFilter(), or repeat the authorization check at the start of each callback. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Older, unsupported releases from 7.0.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82557 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.Form resolves the component that submitted a form from the request parameters in Form#onRequest() and passes the result directly to Form#onFormSubmitted(IFormSubmitter). The check that the submitting component is visible and enabled in its hierarchy runs only when onFormSubmitted() is given no submitter, so it no longer runs for an ordinary form submission, and it is the only point at which Wicket verifies that the application actually offered the named control to the caller. Form#findSubmitter() matches on the request parameter name alone and applies no visibility or enablement filter, and the request handler checks only the form itself, which is visible and enabled. A request that names a submit button the application withheld therefore reaches that button's onSubmit() and onAfterSubmit(), and its onError() when form validation fails; where the button sets setDefaultFormProcessing(false) it reaches onSubmit() and onAfterSubmit() without any form validation. An application is affected where a form submitting component, such as a Button or a SubmitLink, is unavailable to the caller while the enclosing form remains available. How the component was made unavailable does not matter: the component's own setVisible(false), setEnabled(false) or setVisibilityAllowed(false), an overridden isVisible() or isEnabled(), an invisible or disabled parent container anywhere above it, and a RENDER or ENABLE denial from IAuthorizationStrategy — for example through MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy or the AuthorizeAction annotation — are all enforced by that one check, and all of them are bypassed. A component that renders as disabled carries its own input name in the markup the caller already holds. Submissions made through AjaxFormSubmitBehavior, and therefore through AjaxButton and AjaxSubmitLink, are not affected: those are invoked as a behaviour on the button itself, the behaviour's invocation is authorized against that button, and the non-Ajax callbacks of those two classes do nothing. Restrictions applied to the form or to the page rather than to the submitting component are unaffected. The 9.x and 8.x release lines, and the unsupported lines before them, are not affected; the behaviour was introduced in 10.3.0. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 10.3.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.12.0, which fixes the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82558 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.WebSocketBehavior, through which Wicket's native WebSocket support hands a message sent by the client to the application, calls its onMessage() callbacks without checking whether the client may invoke the component the behavior is attached to. Wicket opens a single WebSocket connection per page, and a message received on it is delivered to every WebSocketBehavior of that page. For an Ajax behavior Wicket makes this check before invoking it, through Behavior#canCallListener(Component), which refuses a component that is not visible or not enabled, including one for which the IAuthorizationStrategy denies the RENDER or ENABLE action. A WebSocketBehavior attached to such a component, or to a child of one, therefore receives the client's text and binary messages, together with a WebSocketRequestHandler that writes back to that client, where an Ajax behavior on the same component would be refused. An application is affected where it attaches a WebSocketBehavior that overrides onMessage() to a component that it hides, disables, or restricts through its IAuthorizationStrategy, for example with MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy or the AuthorizeAction annotation. The client needs a session of their own and a page of their own that contains such a component: messages are delivered only to pages in the page store of the client's own session, so this gives no access to another user's session, page or connection. Messages pushed by the server are not affected. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Older, unsupported releases from 6.0.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82704 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.core.request.handler.ListenerRequestHandler invokes an IRequestListener only when org.apache.wicket.Component#canCallListener() allows it, and that method is isEnabledInHierarchy() && isVisibleInHierarchy(). The visibility half reads a flag that carries the outcome of IAuthorizationStrategy#isActionAuthorized() for the Component.RENDER action, and that flag is written in one place only, Component#configure(), during the render phase. A listener URL built by a subclass of org.apache.wicket.core.request.mapper.AbstractBookmarkableMapper carries the page identifier and the component path in a single parameter, and the page identifier may be empty. When it is, a new page instance is constructed, PageProvider#wasExpired() is false because no identifier was supplied, and PageAndComponentProvider#getComponent() finds the component directly on the new instance, so neither a render pass nor Component#configure() runs before the listener is invoked. The flag therefore still holds its constructor default, the component counts as visible, and the listener of a component the authorization strategy denied RENDER for is executed. The same request also skips Component#onConfigure(), so visibility and enablement an application sets there are not applied either. There are two ways to reach this, and neither requires anything but a request. On a page that is stateful, the caller omits the page identifier from a listener URL that would otherwise carry it. On a page that Wicket considers stateless, nothing has to be altered at all: Wicket itself writes listener URLs without a page identifier for such pages, and a component the strategy denies RENDER for is treated as stateless and therefore does not keep the page stateful, so denying RENDER can itself produce the page-id-less form. The second route has never been refused. The ENABLE decision of IAuthorizationStrategy is consulted on every invocation and still refuses, as does a request that supplies the real identifier of a page instance that has already been rendered; a component the application disabled in Component#onConfigure() is protected by neither, because that callback has not run. An application is affected where it withholds an individual component from the caller, either by denying the RENDER action through IAuthorizationStrategy, including through the MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy and AuthorizeAction facilities of wicket-auth-roles, or by setting the component's visibility or enabled flag in Component#onConfigure(), the callback Wicket's own documentation directs applications to use for both. The page carrying such a component has to be constructible from a bookmarkable or mounted URL, which requires a public constructor taking either no arguments or a PageParameters argument. Behaviours pass through the same gate, so an AJAX behaviour attached to such a component is equally exposed. Separately, and whether or not any component is withheld, a listener on a page Wicket considers stateful is invoked on an instance the request itself constructed, so it acts on models built from page parameters the caller supplied rather than on the state the application last rendered. Instantiation authorization is unaffected: IAuthorizationStrategy#isInstantiationAuthorized() is still consulted when the new page instance is created, so a guard placed on the page rather than on the individual component continues to hold. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82705 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.authorization.IAuthorizationStrategy declares isResourceAuthorized(), and that method has a single enforcement point in the framework: org.apache.wicket.request.handler.resource.ResourceRequestHandler, the handler that serves a resource reached through a mounted or shared ResourceReference. Components that are handed an org.apache.wicket.request.resource.IResource instance instead call IResource#respond() themselves from their own request listener and never construct that handler. In wicket-core these are org.apache.wicket.markup.html.link.ResourceLink, org.apache.wicket.markup.html.image.Image and org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.ImageButton; in wicket-extensions it is org.apache.wicket.extensions.ajax.AjaxDownloadBehavior. A resource restricted by a custom isResourceAuthorized() implementation, or by an @AuthorizeResource annotation from wicket-auth-roles, is therefore enforced when it is requested through its own resource URL and is not enforced when the same instance is served through the component that holds it. Which of the two happens is decided by the constructor the application used, and not by anything the application can see in the rendered page. ResourceLink(String, ResourceReference) renders a resource URL and the request is authorized; ResourceLink(String, IResource) renders a component listener URL and it is not. Image, ImageButton and AjaxDownloadBehavior each offer the same pair of constructors and behave the same way. Image and ImageButton write that listener URL into the src attribute of the tag they render, so a browser requests it without any action by the user, and the resource an Image serves may also come from the component's model. An application is affected where it restricts a resource through IAuthorizationStrategy#isResourceAuthorized() or an @AuthorizeResource annotation and then hands that same resource to one of those components as an IResource. An application that does not restrict resources at all is not affected, and neither is a resource that is only mounted or registered as a shared resource. The pattern does not have to be written by the application itself: org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.repeater.data.table.export.ExportToolbar builds each of its export links from an IResource instance, so the exported contents of a data table are served without the resource check in any application that adds that toolbar. As a workaround, register the resource in the application's shared resources and pass the resulting ResourceReference to the component instead of the IResource, so that the request is routed through the handler that consults the authorization strategy. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112887 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-11-02 | N/A |
| Gitea Actions task tokens authenticate to the REST API as a shared system user with a negative ID, which repository, organization, project and key filters treated as having no owner restriction, and the token carried no API scope to restrict user-scoped routes. A user who can run a workflow could use the job's token with `GET /api/v1/user/repos` to list every repository on the instance, including private repositories of other users and organizations, with their metadata. Repository contents remained protected by per-repository permission checks. System users now own nothing, and `/api/v1/user` routes other than `GET /api/v1/user` accept only individual and bot accounts. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81799 | 2 Wordpress, Wpswings | 2 Wordpress, Return Refund And Exchange For Woocommerce | 2026-11-02 | 7.5 High |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in WP Swings Return Refund and Exchange For WooCommerce woo-refund-and-exchange-lite allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Return Refund and Exchange For WooCommerce: from n/a through 4.6.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-113481 | 2026-11-01 | 4.3 Medium | ||
| The Media Library Assistant WordPress plugin before 3.44 does not check that the requesting user is allowed to view a post before disclosing which taxonomy terms are assigned to it, allowing any authenticated user, such as a subscriber, to learn the term assignments of private attachments and posts. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118184 | 1 Wordpress-extensions | 1 Premium Packages | 2026-11-01 | 5.3 Medium |
| The Premium Packages WordPress plugin before 7.2.2 does not prevent unauthenticated visitors from overwriting the stored price of items in their shopping cart, allowing them to create orders for any product at an arbitrary total of their choosing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94361 | 2026-11-01 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| The Payable Payment Gateway for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 1.3.1 does not verify the authenticity of an incoming payment notification before marking a WooCommerce order paid or failed, allowing unauthenticated attackers to change the payment status of any order in the store regardless of the payment method it was placed with. | ||||
| CVE-2026-107343 | 2026-11-01 | 4.3 Medium | ||
| The Kali Forms — Contact Form & Drag-and-Drop Builder WordPress plugin before 2.4.30 does not perform a capability check on its test-email handler, relying only on a nonce that is available to any logged-in user, so a low-privileged user such as a Subscriber can make the site send email to an arbitrary recipient with a spoofed sender address. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118638 | 1 Wordpress-extensions | 1 Mapster Wp Maps | 2026-11-01 | 7.5 High |
| The Mapster WP Maps WordPress plugin before 2.0.6 does not perform any authorization check on a REST API route that writes post data, allowing unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the title of arbitrary posts, create arbitrary published posts, and overwrite the Mapster WP Maps WordPress plugin before 2.0.6's stored settings. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116296 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-11-01 | N/A |
| The API routes for releases, release assets, milestones and repository labels did not reject changes to archived repositories. A user with write access to an archived repository, or a holder of such a user's write-scoped token, could replace or delete release assets while keeping their download URLs, delete releases and tags, and create, edit or delete milestones and labels of a repository that is meant to be read-only. Changing requests on these routes now return 423 Locked for archived repositories. | ||||
| CVE-2026-117649 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-11-01 | N/A |
| The issue timeline API and the web issue page hid cross-reference events that point at issues the reader cannot access, but not "dependency added" and "dependency removed" events. When a readable issue had been linked as a dependency to an issue in a repository the reader cannot access, for example a private repository, any reader of the first issue, including anonymous users of a public repository, received the linked issue's current title, body, state, labels, poster and attachment names through the API, and its repository, number and title on the web page. Creating the link requires access to both issues; comments and attachment downloads of the linked issue stayed protected. Dependency events are now filtered with the same read permission check; a related exposure of unlinked attachment metadata through hidden dependency placeholders was already fixed in 28.2.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119533 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-11-01 | N/A |
| Repository and organization project boards listed the pull requests that reference each issue on the board without checking whether the viewer can read them. When a private pull request mentions an issue on a board the viewer can open, the board revealed the private repository's path and the pull request's number, title and state, to anonymous visitors in the case of a public board. The pull request body, diff and files were not exposed. Boards now skip linked pull requests in repositories where the viewer cannot read pull requests. | ||||