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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-126261 | 1 Fortinet | 1 Fortimanager | 2026-11-10 | 9 Critical |
| A improper authorization vulnerability in Fortinet FortiManager 8.0.0, FortiManager 7.6.0 through 7.6.7, FortiManager 7.4.0 through 7.4.5, FortiManager 7.2.0 through 7.2.8 may allow an unauthenticated attacker that can reach the FGFM port to execute code or commands via crafted FGFM packets. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59632 | 2026-11-10 | 7.5 High | ||
| In RespondReceivedMessage of MtsMessageController.cpp, there is a possible way to trigger memory exhaustion via an undrained message queue due to a type confusion. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59585 | 2026-11-10 | 7.5 High | ||
| In SetDisplayName of RegInfoContact.cpp, there is a possible denial of service due to a missing null check. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58789 | 2026-11-10 | 7.5 High | ||
| In s_gen_tile_param of multiple files, there is a possible way to trigger an out of bounds write in tile parameter arrays due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-126186 | 2026-11-10 | 8.8 High | ||
| Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-126085 | 2026-11-10 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2. | ||||
| CVE-2025-48504 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Operation on a resource after expiration or release in the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to manipulate metadata pages potentially resulting in the loss of confidentiality and integrity of guest memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-0435 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Operation on a resource after expiration or release in the AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow an attacker with administrative privileges to swap out a guest device without the guest's knowledge, potentially resulting in a loss of confidentiality and integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-0454 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| An out-of-bounds write in the AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to corrupt global firmware variables, potentially resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-0480 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Missing Authentication for Critical Function in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to forge SEV-TIO guest request messages potentially compromising SEV-SNP guest memory integrity and confidentiality. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28248 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Improper enforcement of behavioral workflow in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to potentially launch a guest whose attestation report contains an ID key digest for an ID block that doesn't match the guest's measurement resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28247 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Improper Access Control Applied to Mirrored or Aliased Memory Regions in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to change the encryption bit for guest context pages potentially resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28249 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Improper preservation of consistency between independent representations of shared state in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to potentially affect cache coherency for guest context pages resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40668 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Authentication bypass by spoofing in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to request attestation reports for VMPL 0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40669 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| An off-by-one error in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow an attacker with hypervisor access to corrupt the Reverse Map Table (RMP) table, potentially resulting in loss of guest memory integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40670 | 2026-11-10 | N/A | ||
| Improper check for unusual or exceptional conditions in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) could allow a privileged attacker to potentially overlap MMIO regions with DRAM regions resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-4897 | 2 Freedesktop, Redhat | 6 Polkit, Enterprise Linux, Hummingbird and 3 more | 2026-11-10 | 5.5 Medium |
| A flaw was found in polkit. A local user can exploit this by providing a specially crafted, excessively long input to the `polkit-agent-helper-1` setuid binary via standard input (stdin). This unbounded input can lead to an out-of-memory (OOM) condition, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90834 | 2026-11-10 | 5.5 Medium | ||
| The user-mode syscall verifiers for the 16-bit ("wide data") UART API in drivers/serial/uart_handlers.c validated the wrong driver operation. z_vrfy_uart_poll_out_u16(), z_vrfy_uart_tx_u16() and z_vrfy_uart_rx_enable_u16() each ran K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_UART() against the 8-bit op (poll_out, tx, rx_enable) rather than the 16-bit op that the corresponding implementation dereferences (poll_out_u16, tx_u16, rx_enable_u16). z_impl_uart_poll_out_u16(), z_impl_uart_tx_u16() and z_impl_uart_rx_enable_u16() in include/zephyr/drivers/uart/uart_internal.h call their op unconditionally, with no NULL guard of their own, because the verifier is supposed to have established that the op exists. CONFIG_UART_WIDE_DATA is an application-selectable option that no driver selects, and only a handful of the serial drivers in the tree implement any _u16 operation; every other driver leaves those struct uart_driver_api members NULL while still providing the 8-bit ops the old check inspected. In a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_UART_WIDE_DATA (plus CONFIG_UART_ASYNC_API for the uart_tx_u16() and uart_rx_enable_u16() variants), an unprivileged user-mode thread that legitimately holds access to such a UART device object can invoke the _u16 syscall: the object, permission and op checks all pass, and the kernel-side implementation then performs an indirect call through a NULL function pointer while running at supervisor privilege. The result is a CPU exception taken in kernel context instead of the intended K_OOPS or -ENOSYS return. With the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() this halts the system (or warm-reboots it under CONFIG_RESET_ON_FATAL_ERROR), so a thread confined by the userspace sandbox can deny service to the whole device — a capability the user-mode privilege boundary is specifically meant to withhold. The call target is a fixed NULL, so there is no attacker-controlled code execution and no memory disclosure; the separate K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_ARRAY_READ()/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_ARRAY_WRITE() bounds checks on the caller's buffer were and remain correct. The fix points each verifier at the matching _u16 op, using a plain K_SYSCALL_OBJ() object check where the op does not exist or where the implementation already tests it for NULL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90833 | 2026-11-10 | 7.8 High | ||
| The simulated EEPROM driver validated access ranges in eeprom_range_is_valid() (drivers/eeprom/eeprom_simulator.c) with a single test, (offset + len) <= config->size. Because offset is a signed off_t and len an unsigned size_t of the same rank, the addition is evaluated in unsigned arithmetic: a negative offset combined with a compensating len wraps the sum back into the accepted range. eeprom_sim_read() and eeprom_sim_write() then memcpy() through the EEPROM(addr) macro, which is plain pointer arithmetic on the driver's static mock_eeprom array, so the copy addresses memory located before that array. eeprom_read() and eeprom_write() are __syscall entry points, and their verification handlers in drivers/eeprom/eeprom_handlers.c check only the device object and the caller's own data buffer (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE) — the offset argument is passed to the driver unvalidated. With CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a CONFIG_EEPROM_SIMULATOR device instance, and the device object granted to a user thread (the usage the in-tree tests/drivers/eeprom/api suite exercises from ZTEST_USER threads), an unprivileged thread could supply a negative offset and have the kernel perform the copy on its behalf. The result is an out-of-bounds read of kernel .bss returned into the caller's buffer and, via the write path, an out-of-bounds write of caller-supplied bytes over kernel memory preceding mock_eeprom. Both the start address and the length of the affected span are attacker-selected, so the primitive is sufficient to corrupt adjacent kernel state and escape the user-mode sandbox. Exposure is limited to builds that instantiate the simulated EEPROM (status = "okay" by default on qemu_x86 and native_sim, otherwise added by a devicetree overlay) together with userspace isolation. The fix rejects negative offsets and performs the remaining bound check without overflow. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77685 | 2026-11-10 | 8.3 High | ||
| The RFCOMM multiplexer control-channel handler in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/rfcomm.c computed the echo length for a BT_RFCOMM_TEST command as buf->len - 1 and passed it to rfcomm_send_test(), whose length parameter is a uint8_t. A malformed but FCS-valid UIH frame on DLCI 0 can leave buf->len == 0 after rfcomm_handle_msg() pulls the two-byte MCC header, so buf->len - 1 underflows and narrows to 255. rfcomm_send_test() then copies 255 bytes out of a receive buffer that holds no remaining valid data, and appends them to an outgoing L2CAP PDU allocated with only CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU (253 by default for CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC) bytes of tailroom. The source read runs past the end of the ACL receive buffer into adjacent buffers of the same net_buf pool, and the destination copy overruns the transmit buffer by about eight bytes; net_buf_add_mem() performs no runtime bounds check in ordinary builds, where the underlying __ASSERT_NO_MSG() is compiled out. The trigger is a single five-byte RFCOMM frame on the multiplexer control channel, which is processed as soon as the L2CAP channel for PSM 3 is established — before any DLC exists and independent of RFCOMM session state. bt_rfcomm_init() registers that L2CAP server with .sec_level = BT_SECURITY_L1, which l2cap_br_conn_security() accepts without any link key from a peer that does not claim host Secure Simple Pairing support, so an unpaired BR/EDR device in radio range of a connectable target with CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM enabled (SPP, HFP, HSP, GOEP and similar profiles all enable it) can reach the defect. The resulting 255-byte TEST response is transmitted back to the attacker, disclosing roughly 255 bytes of adjacent stack/pool memory — including the contents of neighbouring receive buffers, which an attacker can prime with earlier packets — and the accompanying out-of-bounds write corrupts memory following the transmit buffer, which can crash the Bluetooth host. The request is trivially repeatable, so both the disclosure and the corruption can be driven at will. Two fixes are needed, and the first on its own does not close the out-of-bounds write. Fix 1 (0040ef781e1d, #115768) strips the FCS byte in rfcomm_recv() and echoes buf->len, rejecting anything over UINT8_MAX, which removes the underflow and the over-read. But rfcomm_make_uih_msg() still allocates the response with bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and never compares the requested length with the buffer's tailroom, so a well-formed TEST command carrying a pattern of about 248 bytes or more still builds a response (3-byte frame header, 2-byte message header, pattern, FCS) larger than the 253 bytes available. A pattern that long can only be received when the RFCOMM L2CAP receive MTU (CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM_L2CAP_MTU, which defaults to CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE) exceeds CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU. The plain BR/EDR defaults (200 against 253) cannot reach it, but from v4.3.0 enabling CONFIG_BT_GOEP raises CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE to 264 (265 from v4.4.0), so GOEP builds with only fix 1 applied still overrun the transmit buffer by up to eight bytes. This includes v4.3.2, the last v4.3 release, which carries fix 1 but will not receive fix 2. Fix 2 (214530895dd3, #118293) checks the tailroom on every RFCOMM PDU allocation and closes this residual write. | ||||